While these are certainly important questions one should not forget that a liability regime that is unduly harsh on corporate decision makers can easily deter risk taking even where it is clearly desirable. Before this background, it seems promising to explore whether corporate board members can attain indemnification by involving the shareholders.
This idea seems plausible as the shareholders are viewed by many as the actual 'owners' of a corporation. Whether shareholder approval -or subsequent ratification, in case there was no prior consent -actually is an effective way to limit directors' liability differs depending on the respective jurisdiction. In light of the fact that well-known German corporations such as Siemens and Deutsche Bank have recently made use of this instrument, it will be examined how German stock corporation law deals with the issue. It will be demonstrated that German corporate law offers fairly extensive rules that can, prima facie, be characterized as "black and white": depending on the circumstances liability is either excluded by law or it is not. However, despite this finding considerable uncertainties surround the field of shareholder approval in Germany.
The depiction of German law is intended to serve as a contrast to Australian law. It seems as if there are completely diverging approaches on the issue between the two legal orders. The comparison will ultimately inform the debate on this important issue in Germany as well as in Australia and could be used as an impulse for further discussion (and, ultimately, law reform) for both jurisdictions.
Other Matters
Nil.
